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1. Why a carbon tax? 
Why might South Africa consider a carbon tax? The purpose would be to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. A carbon tax would achieve this through two broad effects – a demand effect, 
reducing energy demand due to higher prices, and a substitution effect, with switching from 
more to less carbon-intensive fuels (Anderson 2008). There are other ways of achieving this 
end, but a carbon tax is a highly effective means of doing so – if experience of actual taxes in 
other countries and modelling of potential taxes in South Africa is any guide. The classic 
argument advanced by many economists against taxes is that they are distortionary.  However, 
as David Pearce has long pointed out, since environmental taxes seek to redress market failures, 
they do not share the distorting properties of many other taxes (Pearce 1991). 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the implications and impact of a carbon tax in 
the South African context – it aims to serve as an introduction rather than an exhaustive 
analysis, and therefore does not draw any comparative conclusions on the suitability of a carbon 
tax by comparison with alternative instruments such as cap and trade systems. Before turning to 
the specific topic of this paper, a carbon tax, some background is given to broadly on economic 
instruments and carbon markets. Following this, existing attempts to model the impact of a 
carbon tax on the South African economy are discussed, followed by a discussion on policy 
challenges and some existing proposals. 
2. International experience with carbon taxes 
In the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union was a strong proponent of a 
carbon tax, harmonised across the globe. The American approach favoured emissions trading, 
based on the experience with SO2 trading in the North-Eastern states.  The Protocol ultimately 
included international emissions trading as one of its three flexible mechanisms (UNFCCC 
1997). It is one of the ironies in the history of climate negotiations that the Bush administration 
withdrew from Kyoto in 2001, and that Europe is now leading the implementation of the largest 
emission trading scheme. 
Carbon taxes have mostly been implemented in Scandinavian countries, and a few other 
European countries. Where they have been implemented, it has often been in concert with other 
policy instruments. Nonetheless, the argument continues to be made for a carbon tax as a ‘pure’ 
economic instrument. A key rationale is the (at least theoretical) greater efficiency of achieving 
environmental outcomes through the price mechanism.  
2.1 Scandinavia 
Finland (1990), Sweden (1991), Norway (1991) and Denmark (1002) led the way in 
implementing a carbon tax. According to a review by Anderson, an important factor favouring 
this shift was that ‘Concerns regarding climate change coincided with priorities to reduce 
income taxation, and combined to a tax shifting exercise’ (Anderson 2008: 63). In terms of the 
basis for the tax, there were different and varying approaches. Finland originally based its tax on 
carbon content, but later combined this with energy content in a 60:40 ratio. Transport fuels (so-
called bunker fuels resulting in marine and aviation emissions) were exempted. Sweden set its 
tax according to the average carbon content of the fuel. Biofuels and peat were exempted, but 
also fuels for electricity generation. Assessing the effectiveness of the tax, Sweden reported 
mitigation in the order of between 0.5–1.5 million tons CO2 per year. Revenues were US$6 
billion or 3 percent of GDP in 1995. Further details of each tax, the levels set and experiences 
gained has been described elsewhere (Tyler et al. 2008). 
Among the Scandinavian countries, Denmark’s approach of combining a carbon tax with 
subsidies for energy efficiency appears to have had the best results, noting that its energy sector 
is more carbon-intensive (Anderson 2004). Anderson in his earlier study concluded that, ‘on 
balance, the studies appear to show that emissions have been curbed when compared to 
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business-as-usual forecasts, while absolute CO2 reduction remains the exception’ (Anderson 
2004: 3502). More specific findings in his review of various studies are reproduced in Table 1. 
Table 1: Effects of CO2 taxes as identified by selected studies with differing focus| 
Source: Anderson (2004: 15) 
CO2 reductions Study Country  Period 
Reductions  Role of CO2 tax 
ECON (1994, 1997)  Norway  - - 30% 
NUTEK (1994)  Sweden  1990–1994  - 3–5% 
Naturvårdsverket (1995)  Sweden  1987–1994  - 19%
a
 [3–5%
b
] 
Shopley and Brasseur (1996)  Denmark  - – 20%  Not identified 
Clasen (1998)  Denmark  - - Significant 
Ministry of Finance (1999)  Denmark   5% reduction 
a. Excluding transport sector 
b. Including transport sector 
 
European experiences also led to a ‘relatively broad consensus about the properties of revenue-
neutral environmental tax reform’ (Anderson 2008:64). A fiscally neutral approach is both more 
attractive for tax policy, and the incentives packaged together with the carbon tax can address 
socio-economic priorities.  
2.2 Other parts of Europe  
Anderson examined six European countries that implemented Environmental Tax Reforms 
(ETR) and showed reductions in fuel demand and GHG emissions, on average by 3.1 percent in 
2004 against the counter-factual baseline (Anderson 2008). The size of the reduction in fuel 
demand depended on the tax rate, its basis, availability of substitute fuels. A notable exception 
was the German ETR, which was not efficient in reducing GHGs – because it excluded coal!  
Another feature of the European experience relate to exemptions. Energy-intensive industries in 
particular will argue the case of exemptions from a broad carbon tax. Anderson notes the 
complicated schemes have been designed to balance, cap, or reduce the tax. Member states 
apply to the European Commission for approval, essentially for lower tax rates. While the 
burden on energy-intensive industries ‘remains negative … due to many exemptions, the actual 
burden is rather modest’ (Anderson 2008: 79). From an economic perspective, however, the 
exemptions are distortionary.  
2.3 Lessons for South Africa  
Recycling of revenue, poverty and development: In Scandinavia, the desire to reduce income 
taxation may have created a favourable environment for the introduction of a carbon tax. In 
South Africa, tax relief has been given in years when it was possible, and while the South 
African Revenue Services could still over-recover tax – but this may change with the global 
financial crisis (Manual 2008). A priority that is not likely to change any time soon is that given 
to poverty alleviation and job creation (Manuel 2008; AsgiSA 2006). If revenues from a carbon 
tax can be combined with reduced taxes or incentives for the poor (e.g. subsidies for food-stuffs 
consumed primarily by the poor, or a basic income grant), the overall tax-incentive package 
would be better aligned with major development priorities.  
Combining a tax with incentives and revenue-neutrality: This relates directly to another 
possible lesson for South Africa. Anderson’s review, cited above, noted a broad consensus that 
taxation should be revenue-neutral. Such an approach would not raise concerns about new taxes, 
especially when the purpose of the tax is not to raise revenues. Nonetheless, how the revenues 
are recycled – also taking into account priorities of poverty and employment – needs to be 
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agreed. Structuring an overall tax-incentive package seems less likely to raise objections of 
‘ring-fencing’ than a dedication of revenues to particular expenditure.  
Potential for double dividends: With an integrated approach, a ‘double dividend’ can be 
achieved – improving social welfare while reducing environmental damages. This general 
proposition was supported done by analysis for the LTMS process (Pauw 2007; Winkler 2007), 
which in turn built on early findings of even a ‘triple dividend’ by other CGE modelers (Van 
Heerden et al. 2006). A fiscally neutral package can reap positive benefits for employment.  
Approach to energy-intensive sectors: Learning from the European experiences with carbon 
taxes, requests for exemptions from a general carbon tax should be anticipated. The more a firm 
spends on energy as a share of its total costs, the more sensitive it would be to a carbon tax, 
other things being equal. Energy-intensive industries, in particular, may ask for lower tax rates. 
On the positive side, energy-intensive industries are often capital-intensive, so that structural 
change to more labour-intensive (and less energy-intensive) sectors would have benefits for 
employment (Fisher & Grubb 1997). 
Rather than dealing with this on an ad hoc basis, a structured approach for energy-intensive 
sectors may be important. As an overall strategy for a low-carbon economy, it has been 
suggested that energy-intensive sectors be required to reduce their energy intensity, while 
protecting employment. This strategy would require a combination of reviewing existing policy 
promoting beneficiation, specific energy-intensity targets, international negotiations on best 
location for such industries, and diversification within these sectors (Winkler & Marquard 
2007). What is also from the international experience is that too many exemptions create an 
unequal playing field. And if the upshot of ad hoc adjustments was to exclude most emissions 
from coal (as in the German case), the tax is likely to become ineffective. This is discussed 
further in more detail in the section below on design of a tax system. 
3. Potential impact of a tax on the South African 
economy 
The potential impact of a carbon tax on South Africa is uncertain; however, some modelling 
work has been done to explore the response of the economy and the energy system to the 
imposition of such a tax. Two energy modelling studies have been done, and two economy-wide 
modelling studies have been done: a partial equilibrium model of the whole energy system was 
developed for the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios project, and the impact of a carbon tax was 
modelled in some detail, which gives some indication of how the energy system would respond, 
and at what price levels. Another modelling study was completed as part of NERSA’s third 
National Integrated Resource Plan for the electricity sector only, which contained a carbon tax 
scenario. As part of the LTMS project, the economy-wide implications of a carbon tax were 
explored using a CGE model, and in a separate study, also using a CGE model, Blignaut et al 
also explored the economic implications of a carbon tax. These results are outlined below. 
3.1 Impact of a carbon tax on the energy system  
3.1.1 The LTMS modelling framework 
In the analysis for the LTMS (Winkler 2007) (Hughes et al. 2007; Winkler 2007), a carbon tax 
was shown to be very effective in reducing GHG emissions, and was the largest emission 
reductions of all options analysed – the largest ‘wedge’ in graphical terms.1 A carbon tax is 
                                                     
1  The notion of ‘wedges’ was developed by Pacala and Socolow (2004) to show that a range of 
existing technologies could deliver 1 GtC in emission reductions over the next 25 years. The 
challenge was to scale up technologies, provide policy guidance and channel investment. ‘Wedges’ 
in the LTMS context were adapted to mean emission reductions over time. If the reduction increase 
over time, the graphs have the shape of a wedge. Mitigation actions and the resultant wedges are 
used somewhat interchangeably in this report.  
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actually a means of implementation rather than a mitigation option, since it would incentivise a 
range of mitigation options (for example renewable energy, energy efficiency, etc). Like all 
bottom-up models, the modelling framework for the LTMS is dependent on the technological 
alternatives available in the model. In this section, we refer in particular to an escalating CO2 tax 
as modelled for the LTMS process (Hughes et al. 2007; Winkler 2007).2  
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Figure 1: Emission reductions from an escalating CO2 tax 
The CO2 tax was also the dominant element in the most successful strategic option for 
mitigation. Note that emissions trading was not explicitly modelled – in uses of Markal as a 
methodology for such an analysis, a carbon tax is often used as a proxy for emissions trading. 
However, other incentives, such as subsidies for renewables for electricity generation or solar 
water heaters, were assessed. Again, however, the metholodogy used in LTMS did not model 
trading of permits in any explicit way (Winkler 2007).  
GHG reductions resulted primarily as a result of shifting from coal-based energy carriers to 
others, particularly in the electricity sector (to nuclear and renewable energy), in the liquid fuels 
sector (from synfuels to crude oil refineries), and in industry (from coal to natural gas). In the 
Growth Without Constraints scenario (business as usual or the baseline scenario), coal 
dominates electricity production, contributes significantly to liquid fuels production, and 
dominates many thermal applications in industry. The results of the shift are portrayed in the 
figures below. 
                                                     
2  The tax level starts at R100 / t CO2-eq in 2008, rises to R250 by 2020, i.e. in a period when the rate 
of growth of emissions might need to be slowed, even if absolute emissions still rise. It is then kept 
at that level for a decade, approximating a case where emissions stabilise (since the tax still induces 
changes in the system). After 2030, it rises more sharply in a phase of absolute emission reductions. 
It is capped at R750, a level which is maintained for the last decade.  
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Figure 2: Electricity generating capacity by plant type: escalating CO2 tax 
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Figure 3: Output from refineries and synfuel plants: escalating CO2 tax 
The model has a high sensitivity to the tax level, but the response of the model to increases in 
the tax level is not even, and is highly dependent on available alternatives and the cost of these 
in each sector. For instance, in the electricity sector the alternatives to the cheapest technology 
(coal) are viable are relatively low tax levels, whereas synfuels become unviable at a slightly 
higher level, and alternative carbon-free transport technologies such as electric vehicles (with a 
non-carbon electricity source) only become viable with a very high tax level (at current costs). 
Thus, the response of the energy system to different levels of carbon tax is dependent on 
existing alternatives, and the development of new technologies will increase the responsiveness 
of the system. The modelling framework does not take into account shifts in the structure of the 
The economic implications of a carbon tax  6 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE  The economics of climate change mitigation 
economy which would result from structural changes in energy prices; these are uncertain and 
would probably increase the impact of the tax.  
As a result, from what is known about the structure of the energy system, the carbon intensity of 
its components, and the cost of existing components and alternatives, the modelling results give 
clues about an optimal level for a carbon tax, subject to key policy goals. The figure below 
illustrates the modelled response of the energy system to different tax levels in 2003 Rands. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4, in which it can be seen that the marginal impact of higher tax 
levels declines from R140 up. There are significant gains from R140 to R400, but the marginal 
gains after this are insignificant, and the gain from R750 to R1000 is negligible. The problem of 
setting the level of the tax with a particular mitigation goal in mind (a key policy problem) 
could be approached in this way, as well as the design of appropriate supportive programmes 
aimed at enhancing the responsiveness of the economy to the tax. The responsiveness would 
change over time, as new technologies became available, and as the structure of the economy 
changed. Thus the process of setting the required tax level would have to be sensitive to these 
developments. 
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Figure 4: Mitigation impact of different tax levels 
The economic implications of a carbon tax  7 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE  The economics of climate change mitigation 
3.1.2 Modeling of electricity sector for NIRP3 
The third National Integrated Resource Plan3 (NIRP3) considered analysis of a carbon tax as 
well, providing analysis from a separate process (NERSA 2008). Having developed a reference 
case and a number of diversified plans, sensitivity analysis4 was conducted, introducing a 
carbon tax. The plans were not re-optimised, but rather re-run with the tax to indicate sensitivity 
of each resource plan to a possible future environmental tax.  
In the a first analysis (Stage 4), it was found that a ‘R100/tonne CO2 tax is not enough to 
overcome the higher capital and fixed O&M costs associated with nuclear technology’, but that 
increasing tax levels to R200 / ton did overcome the cost barriers. A further round of analysis 
(NIRP3, Stage 5) extended the analysis, considering not only nuclear (diversified plan 2), but 
also gas (diversified plan 1) and renewables (diversified plan 3) as alternatives; and reporting 
changes in revenue requirements. The nuclear plan (2) showed the greatest response to the 
carbon tax, but also the highest Present Value Revenue Requirement (PVRR). Renewables (3) 
was still the most economical plan on a PVRR basis. The analysis found that ‘the carbon tax 
does not impact the relative ranking based on that criteria’, i.e. PVRR.  
For the purposes of this paper, the result of interest are the tax levels. A significant difference 
was found by NIRP3, with R100 / ton CO2-eq not sufficient to overcome cost barriers, but a 
much more marked effect at R200 / ton (2006 Rands).  
3.2 Economy-wide modelling 
3.2.1 Economy-wide modeling for LTMS  
The Markal modeling results considered the direct effects in the energy sector only. Economy-
wide analysis, using computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis was also conducted in 
support of LTMS (Pauw 2007). The CGE analysis converted a given level of a CO2 tax to a 
comparative tax on coal, crude oil or natural gas used as intermediate inputs in production 
processes. By including simulation of a CO2 tax in a CGE context, the indirect effects across the 
economy are also captured.  
In other words, the modeling includes direct effects (shifts in electricity generation from coal to 
renewables and nuclear; or away from synfuel), but also indirect effects. For example, 
renewable energy technologies like solar thermal plants would require more of some inputs (e.g. 
glass for mirrors) and less of others (e.g. coal). In this example, suppliers of glass would see 
increased demand for their product, increasing output and employment in that sector; while coal 
mines would see less demand. Economy-wide modeling indicates the net effect and provides 
information on effects on economic output and employment, among others.  
Taxes generate revenues. The way in which revenues are recycled turns out to be critical to the 
overall socio-economic effects. Revenue from a CO2 tax can be used in a variety of ways by 
government: 
• to reduce its deficit;  
• to further mitigation, if recycled in the form of production subsidies for 
nuclear/renewable energy and biofuels); or  
                                                     
3  The NIRP is an electricity sector planning exercise conducted by NERSA, the national energy 
regulator, which in theory considers supply and demand-side options for meeting projected 
electricity demand. Eskom conducts its own more influential integrated planning process (ISEP), and 
may well have modelled the impacts of a carbon tax, but this is confidential, and no information on 
this was available. 
4  This analysis was conducted using the PAR software in a stochastic mode (that is, incorporating the 
stochastic risk variables (NERSA 2008). More complex effects that might be triggered by a carbon 
tax, such as changes in energy demand or the cost of fuel, were not included in the NIRP3 sensitivity 
analysis.   
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• in ways aimed at off-setting the potential effects of higher energy prices on the poor, 
through food subsidies, reduced VAT or income tax or increased welfare transfers.  
The CGE analysis found that, in a range of R25-75 per ton of CO2-eq, it appears possible to off-
set negative economic effects through complementary policies (Pauw 2007). However, the 
break-point in economic effects appears to occur between R100 and R200, for example in 
relation to Stern’s one percent of GDP benchmark (Winkler 2007). Employment changes 
(assumed food-price recycling) stay positive up to R100 for semi-skilled and R200 for unskilled 
workers. At R100, wage changes are still slight (and ambiguous in sign).  
3.2.2 Dynamic economy-wide modeling for LTMS  
A methodological improvement, suggested in meeting with senior economists, was 
implemented in response to enquiries from the Forum of South African Directors-General 
(FOSAD). The original analysis (section 3.2.1) was comparative static, i.e. increased investment 
in one period did not increase capital stock in the next, since there was no time and investment 
was exogenous. The dynamic variant it allows for capital stock to be updated in the model, so 
that increased investment enhances the productive capacity of the economy over time. There 
was no specific analysis of different tax levels.  
Many of the detailed findings of the comparative static analysis were confirmed. The relevant 
LTMS strategic option is ‘Use the market’, driven by a CO2 tax. For Use the market, the 
accounting for investment makes a major difference. Impact on GDP is mildly positive (0.73%) 
instead of the previous -2%. The earlier result was due to large increases in energy prices which 
seriously hurt the economy; in the dynamic analysis these price increases are now 
overshadowed by higher investments. The impact on jobs is shown to be very small, but 
positive, in the dynamic analysis; whereas in the static modeling, an increase in jobs for low-
skilled had its counterpoint in decreased for skilled workers. Income from employment 
increases for all household groups. The differences in welfare effects are marginal in the static 
analysis, but taking into account dynamic effects, all households are better off. For low-income 
households, the reinvestment of revenues is important to ensure their welfare does not suffer. 
Various options (food subsidies, reducing the VAT rate, general welfare transfers) for recycling 
revenue have been examined in both economy-wide studies.  
3.2.3 Economy-wide modelling and ‘triple dividends’  
Earlier analysis using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyse environmental 
taxes on energy investigated the potential for recycling. The analysis suggests that a reduction in 
food prices may pay ‘triple dividends’ in mitigating unwanted effects of environmental taxes 
(Van Heerden et al. 2006). Taxes considered were on GHGs, fuel inputs, electricity use, or 
energy. Revenue recycling could occur through in one of three ways: (i) a direct tax break on 
both labour and capital, (ii) an indirect tax break to all households, or (iii) a reduction in the 
price of food. The study concluded that with a ‘food tax handback’, all four policies had the 
potential to reduce CO2 emissions, grow GDP and reduce poverty (Van Heerden et al. 2006). 
However, in establishing an updated GHG inventory, the authors depart from the standard IPCC 
methodology and rely entirely on energy balances. Future work with combine the analysis in 
this book with the complementary work in the article (Van Heerden et al. 2006), improving the 
rigour of GHG analysis while adding the benefit of indirect economic effects from CGE 
modeling.  
4. Policy issues in designing a tax for South Africa  
South Africa has not implemented a carbon tax. Some see the announcement by the Finance 
Minister of a 2c/ kWh levy on non-renewable energy (Manuel 2008) as the first carbon tax – 
and it would have the same effect. Current proposals from the Treasury, which are outlined in 
more detail below, are contained an internal government policy paper released for public 
comment in 2006 (National Treasury 2006) on environmental fiscal reform. The tax would form 
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part of an overall response strategy to climate change, and would relate to both an overall policy 
shift towards sustainable development, and also to other relevant policy domains (for instance 
energy security). We review the overall context before focusing on some key policy issues, of 
which the most important in South Africa are probably 1) how the initial tax level is set, and 
what mechanisms can be put in place to adjust the level; and 2) whether to apply the tax across 
the whole economy, or whether to develop special dispensations for potentially vulnerable 
groups (energy-intensive users and poor households). Thereafter we briefly discuss the Treasury 
proposals. 
4.1 Context: shifting to a low-carbon development path 
As outlined in the introductory paper to this series, South Africa faces a particular challenge 
with mitigation, given that historically, the energy economy has been built around the minerals-
energy complex (Fine & Rustomjee 1996). This complex comprises mining, minerals 
processing, the energy sector, and associated industries linked to these sectors, based initially on 
mining, and then on beneficiation.  
This historical structure of the economy also included comparatively low electricity prices. 
Policy on industrial development has promoted electricity-intensive investments, such as the 
smelting of aluminium at Coega or steel at Saldanha. Low electricity tariffs for industry are seen 
as a competitive advantage in attracting aluminium smelters to South Africa rather than other 
countries (Bond 2000). The Coega Development Corporation actively marketed the availability 
of electricity at ‘very favourable rates’ to attract investment (CDC 2004).5  
The world is moving toward a low-carbon economy and society (LCS 2006; UK 2003; UNDP 
& GEF 2002). South Africa’s own mitigation scenarios suggested that a ‘transition to a low-
carbon economy’ was one of the fundamental transitions in the longer term (SBT 2007: 23). 
The risk of the current approach is that, while they may promote industrial development in the 
short run, they carry a high risk of ‘locking in’ the economy into energy intensive industries, 
when environmental, economic and social pressures may push South Africa in the opposite 
direction (Spalding-Fecher 2001). The reason for the ‘lock in’ effect is that, once a major 
investment like a smelter is made, there are very limited opportunities to improve the energy 
efficiency or alter the production process. Recent investments in steel and aluminium bear this 
out – while the processes may be optimized for that technology, the wholesale switch to a more 
efficient technology is very costly after construction (Visser et al 1999).  
While growth trends in the economy in the last two decades have resulted in higher growth in 
the advanced manufacturing and services sectors (as part of an orthodox development path), 
significant investment in energy-intensive industries in the 1990s has limited this 
diversification, and several new mega-projects (including a new aluminium smelter) are now in 
the planning stage. From 2008 onwards, though, the electricity crisis and particularly narrow 
reserve margins meant that some projects were put on hold. In terms of the national response, 
conserving energy and increasing efficiency are given much higher priority (DME 2008).  
Forward-looking economic and industrial policies could target less energy-intensive economic 
sectors. ‘An active industrial policy is required to diversity the economy forward from South 
Africa’s mineral-energy complex into capital and intermediate goods’ (Michie & Padayachee 
1998: 634). This would represent a major shift in industrial policy and would take decades to 
complete, given large investments in infrastructure. However, given the ‘lock-in’ effect, short-
term decisions (the next power station, the next smelter or not) are critical in changing the 
trajectory of South Africa’s energy development path. ‘Bending the curve’ requires a long-term 
perspective, but also involves policy changes in the immediate future (Raskin et al. 1998; 
Zipplies 2009).  
What interventions might shift the South African economy to less emissions-intensive sectors? 
Five possible strategies have been examined elsewhere (Winkler & Marquard 2007), but are 
                                                     
5  ‘There are sufficient electricity and water resources to meet the future demands within the Industrial 
Development Zone. These utilities are available in bulk at very favourable rates’ (CDC 2004) 
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summarised here. The first strategy would be to adjust state incentives (including industrial 
incentive programmes and special dispensations on low electricity prices) to avoid attracting 
further energy-intensive investments on terms which would severely restrict future mitigation 
options, and shift these incentives to lower carbon industries. Secondly, South Africa might 
focus its mitigation efforts on non-energy-intensive6 sections of the economy, assuming that 
their international competitiveness would suffer less. Thirdly, however, the energy-intensive 
sectors themselves should not be ignored – they would be required to reduce their energy 
intensity, while protecting employment. This third strategy would require a combination of 
reviewing existing policy promoting beneficiation, specific energy-intensity targets, 
international negotiations on best location for such industries, and diversification within these 
sectors (Winkler & Marquard 2007). The fourth strategy might be economic instruments, such 
as a carbon tax or domestic emissions trading, which would be expected to affect the energy-
intensive sectors most strongly. ‘Putting a price on carbon’ now has political support (ANC 
2007). The Treasury, having conducted a discussion of options for environmental fiscal reform 
(National Treasury 2006), announced in 2008 that four options would come ‘under scrutiny for 
implementation include[ing] the use of emission charges and tradable permits, tax incentives for 
cleaner production technologies and reform of the existing vehicle taxes to encourage fuel 
efficiency’ (Manuel 2008). While policy design will be elaborated further, an initial levy of 2c / 
kWh on the sale of non-renewable electricity is to be collected at source from the electricity 
generator. Fifth, the focus of industrial policy and investment strategy could shift to less energy- 
and emissions-intensive sectors of the economy. These five strategies are in many instances 
complementary – a carbon tax implemented on its own is likely to be far less effective, and 
would possibly have a negative impact on the economy without reducing emissions. The aim of 
developing an integrated suite of mitigation policies around a set of economic instruments 
would thus be to minimise the impacts of the transition from a high- to a low-carbon 
development path, and to maximise the benefits. Some specific aspects of this transition are 
discussed below. 
4.2 Key policy issues 
A range of key policy issue and design questions will need to be addressed in considering the 
implementation of a carbon tax in South Africa. These would include:  
• more detailed investigation of the effectiveness of a carbon tax in reducing ghg 
emissions;  
• detailed investigation of tax-setting and adjusting mechanisms; 
• equity, distributional impacts and addressing poverty and development; 
• combining a tax with incentives and recycling of revenues; 
• legislative compatibility; 
• technical and administrative viability, including the tax base and definitions of taxable 
events; 
• competitiveness effects and a structured approach to energy-intensive exporting sectors; 
and 
• adjoining policy areas. 
Within this broader set of issues, our initial analysis has focused on three specific issues. The 
first concerns the level at which the tax should be set to bring about the required level of 
emissions reductions; the second concerns the potential impact of a carbon tax on poor 
households, and what measures could be taken to avoid this; and the third key issue concerns 
energy-intensive industries, and what measures could be put in place to avoid negative impacts 
to the economy which may arise from applying a carbon tax. 
                                                     
6  Energy-intensive industries could be identified by the percentage of their costs spent on energy. 
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4.2.1 Setting an appropriate tax level 
Different methodologies (discussed above) have both suggested that increasingly higher tax 
levels see diminishing returns in terms of mitigation. Both Markal energy modeling (partial 
equilibrium) and CGE analysis suggests that, over a certain threshold, further increases in the 
tax level do not result in significant further mitigation, and beyond a certain level almost no 
further mitigation results. As discussed above, the location of this threshold is critically 
dependent on available alternative technologies and their cost. Thus, as new technology 
becomes available, and as costs of alternatives drop (as they are expected to as low-carbon 
technology is developed and deployed globally), the optimum tax level will change. 
The challenge, therefore, is how to set the tax to get appropriate long-term mitigation, while 
preserving efficiency; or, in other words, how to set the lowest tax level which will achieve the 
required emissions reduction in the short, medium and long terms. The most preferable options 
would be to develop a flexible mechanism which can respond to new developments, but is also 
transparent enough to engender long-term investment in low-carbon technologies by investors. 
Technically, the tax should escalate through the mitigation curve as mitigation options are 
required, but the precise costs of mitigation are only known after the fact; ex ante they can only 
be modelled or otherwise projected. Since these projections exclude changes in demand for 
GHG-linked services, there is a significant level of uncertainty. A possible solution to assist 
with price discovery, but also with a built-in automatic adjustment procedure, would be to 
define a band around a desirable emissions pathway. The ‘peak, plateau and decline’ trajectory 
outlined by Cabinet in considering the LTMS (Van Schalkwyk 2008) is the obvious candidate 
for setting the desired pathway. A tax level would then be set around a level that is expected to 
achieve the desired result. Given that the exact response to the price signal is not known (needs 
to be discovered), this should be accompanied by an escalation (or decline) mechanism which 
adds, for example, 10 percent to the tax level if actual emissions are within a certain % outside 
the ‘zone’. Conversely, if emissions turn out to reduce in practice by more than expected, the 
tax level would be lowered by 10 percent. Bands for greater changes (e.g. 20 percent, 30 
percent) would be defined.  
Figure 5 below demonstrates the concept graphically. The green band represents the desired 
‘peak , plateau and decline’ trajectory, and the bands on either side designate deviations from 
the trajectory. Actual emissions are indicated by the black line. Thus, in zone A, emissions 
depart from the desired trajectory and enter the +10% band, and during this period, the carbon 
tax escalates by 10 percent per year. In zone B, emissions depart further from the band into the 
+20% band, and the tax escalates by 20 percent per year. In zone C, the impact of a high carbon 
tax leads to a decline in emissions back into the +10 percent band, and the tax escalates by 10 
percent. In zone D, emissions follow the desired band and the tax does not change, and in zone 
E emissions drop below the desired band and the tax is reduced by 10 percent per year. 
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Figure 5: Conceptual diagram of a carbon tax adjustment mechanism 
The initial tax level is still very important, to prevent rapid change after the tax regime begins, 
as is the proposed emissions trajectory. From a strategic point of view, it is arguable that this 
will lead to a more cautious approach to investment in new carbon-intensive technology than a 
constant tax by firms, given the risk that other firms might increase their emissions and increase 
the general tax level. Thus in some ways this arrangement would mimic a carbon market in that 
greater emissions levels would lead automatically to a higher carbon price, and vice versa, but 
without the short-term market volatility. While the behaviour of small firms would be fairly 
easy to predict, the strategic response of larger emitters (especially those who emit a significant 
percentage of total emissions) would have to be more carefully considered. 
As a starting point, South Africa might consider tax levels of around R200/ton, which in 
nominal terms equates to around R140 in 2003 Rands (in the LTMS study). To give a sense of 
these tax levels, R200 / t CO2eq is roughly comparable to an increase in electricity tariffs of 20c 
/ kWh. For liquid fuels, it might translate to around 45 cents / litre for a tax of R 200 per ton of 
CO2. Current research indicates that this is not enough to incentivise non-fossil fuel sources 
such as renewable electricity generation, but current emissions trends indicate that the tax would 
rise rapidly using the above mechanism to a level which would. In the short term, the increase in 
price would be a powerful incentive to energy efficiency programmes. 
4.2.2 Avoiding impacts of a carbon tax on the poor 
A carbon tax would be likely to have two impacts on the poor. The first would be a direct 
impact on the cost of energy carriers used by poor households, directly on electricity, paraffin, 
LPG and coal, and indirectly through higher fuel prices in transporting bulk solid fuels such as 
coal and fuelwood, where applicable. The second would be indirect economic effects, either via 
higher input costs for services used by the poor (for instance public transport), or via economy-
wide impacts. 
The impacts on the price of household energy carriers are relatively easy to predict, and would 
be also be easy to mitigate. If programmes to this end were implemented, households would 
actually be better off that they are now. The negative impacts of fuels such as paraffin, coal and 
wood on the welfare of poor households are well-known; the most desirable energy carriers for 
households which do not have these impact are electricity and LPG. The use of electricity by 
poor households has been dramatically extended through the accelerated electrification 
programme, but it was necessary to introduce further incentives (free basic electricity) to 
encourage wider electricity use in households, as affordability was a major problem. Imposing a 
carbon tax would make electricity even less affordable. So far, policy initiatives to encourage 
the use of LPG have failed. In the light of the negative impacts of paraffin and other inferior 
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fossil fuels, there would be welfare advantages to imposing carbon taxes on these fuels if their 
use was further discouraged. 
Thus the most sensible approach to this problem would be to address it in the context of 
household energy policy as a whole, and use pricing mechanisms to further encourage a shift 
from paraffin and coal to electricity and LPG in poor households. This could be done in several 
ways: 1) in exchange for setting tariffs for poor households at a lower level, a carbon tax rebate 
could be granted on electricity sold to poor households (assuming a clear criterion exists); 2) the 
existing system of hidden cross-subsidies could be extended, which would effectively imply a 
slightly higher carbon tax for other users; or 3) a block tariff proposed by a number of 
stakeholders, which would allocate free electricity in the first block, followed by inclining 
blocks. This would have to be designed so that low-income households (which consume less 
electricity) pay less for electricity, and that other households then meet the revenue requirement 
of the utility, i.e. another form of cross-subsidy, but one which also has the effect of 
discouraging excess electricity consumption by households. LPG would be much more difficult 
to exempt, given its alternative uses in non-poor households, commerce, industry and transport, 
but an exemption could be targeted at small cylinder sizes only. In addition, on the demand side, 
programmes such as the Kuyasa housing project, which improved the efficiency of households, 
result in considerable energy savings and welfare benefits. At the same time, it would be 
imperative not to extend tax exemptions or cross-subsidies to non-poor households as higher 
energy costs would provide a powerful incentive to energy efficiency. 
Indirect impacts, either through increased cost of services such as transport or other economy-
wide impacts are more difficult to assess. In the case of poor households, transport has a similar 
property to energy provision in that it is underprovided, unaffordable and also unsafe. Providing 
enhanced public transport has been shown to have significant sustainable development benefits 
as well as mitigation benefits, and there is currently no evidence that a carbon tax would 
outweigh the efficiency gains inherent in implementing an effective public transport policy. 
Economy-wide modelling of the impact of a carbon tax has been attempted by Van Heerden on 
revenue recyling and ‘triple dividends’ (2006) and the impact on poor households (Pauw 2007) 
(see section 3.2.1).  
The Van Heerden study (see section 3.2.3) argued that energy in South Africa is complementary 
to capital and that this factor together with tax recycling that increases unskilled labour demand 
can produce a double or even ‘triple dividend’. They find that recycling environmental tax 
revenues through reduction in food costs is particularly effective in achieving CO2 reduction, 
economic growth and poverty alleviation (Van Heerden et al. 2006). Macro-economic analysis 
thus provides an indication that there may be synergies at the societal level; yet climate policy 
would affect individual sectors, with winners and losers. Hence a degree of trade-off is likely to 
remain.  
4.2.3 Energy-intensive industries 
There is probably a case to be made for singling out energy-intensive industries in South Africa. 
What criteria one might use to identify these industries is uncertain, but the most commonly-
proposed criterion is that energy costs are above a certain threshold percentage of total input 
costs.7 As a result, energy price fluctuations have a much greater impact on the profitability of 
these industries, particularly if commodities are being produced for export and thus compete on 
the international market. Steep increases in South African energy prices could render these firms 
globally uncompetitive. This vulnerability is made more likely by the fact that because of the 
prevalence of very low long-term energy prices (and often long-term contracts, especially for 
electricity, guaranteeing future very low energy prices), firms investing in energy-intensive 
industries invested in relatively energy-inefficient equipment; as a result, South Africa’s 
economy is not only energy-intensive, but the energy-intensive sectors of it are comparatively 
                                                     
7  Poor households have a similar property, in that energy costs are often a particularly high percentage 
of total household expenditure – this common property identifies these two groups as particularly 
sensitive to energy price changes 
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inefficient (Den Elzen et al. 2007). In developing a carbon tax, the aim is to incentivise both 
producers and consumers to reduce carbon intensity. The problem is that we have no verifiable 
information about what impact such a tax would have on any particular industry, nor on what 
the potential for improving the energy efficiency (and/or carbon efficiency for direct emissions) 
of these industries is, and what the cost would be. Moreover, many of these industries would not 
pass on cost increases due to the tax to consumers because of the regulatory environment in 
which they operate (for instance, Sasol would not be able to pass on the cost of a carbon tax to 
consumers without a change in the liquid fuels regulatory system); this would weaken the 
impact of the tax, but in some cases still provide a strong incentive to producers. Thus, any 
special dispensation regarding energy-intensive users should involve the following elements: 
• If there is a special allowance for energy-intensive users, it should exclude new investment 
or expansion of existing plant, as part of the aim of a carbon tax would be to incentivise a 
low-carbon development path. This would also prevent ‘carbon leakage’ from other 
countries with carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems. New entrants would have to pay the 
full tax. This may create a barrier to entry, and the implications would have to be explored 
further, and considered in terms of competition legislation and industrial and trade policy, as 
well as WTO rules. A fixed period for special allowances would have to be defined for 
existing plants to prevent older and less efficient plants from being operated longer than in a 
non-tax scenario. 
• Competitiveness of existing industries operating in the international market would need to be 
protected, but a process of discovery would be necessary to demonstrate that this is a real 
problem. Adequate incentives would still have to be provided to take up any significant 
opportunities for reducing the carbon/energy intensity of these firms. 
• If possible, the price signal to consumers should be preserved to incentivise a shift to 
consumption of lower-carbon goods and services. 
• If there is no possibility of firms responding to a tax incentive (for instance, because of a 
lack of available technology alternatives), there is no point in imposing one, but this is 
unlikely in South Africa given the extremely low energy prices of the last 30 years. 
To meet the above criteria, the measure which seems most appropriate is one developed in 
Sweden (Anderson 2008), where energy-intensive industries had the option of applying for an 
exemption from the tax in exchange for which they embarked on an independently-monitored 
programme of disclosure and energy efficiency improvements. This would explicitly exclude 
power generation, but would involve electricity-intensive industries getting a rebate on carbon 
taxes applied to electricity generation, which would not lessen the incentive to the utility to 
invest in low-carbon generation; however the real price of electricity would then rise faster, 
which would undermine the effectiveness of the tax exemption. It is also not clear what the 
terms of the long-term supply agreements between Eskom and some energy-intensive users 
stipulate about increasing costs of generation or new taxes. 
For technologies where there are international precedents (for instance, iron and steel, or pulp 
and paper), international best practice benchmarks would be set, and firms would have to launch 
independently monitored and verified programmes which achieved the international benchmark 
within a specified time period. There may be scope for offering a reduced tax rate to new 
entrants who confirm to the benchmark. This is more complex in the case of specific South 
African technologies which do not have widespread application elsewhere; for instance synfuels 
and deep-level gold mining. In the former case, since this is one of the only plants of its kind in 
the world, benchmarking would be much more difficult. Another alternative would be to impose 
an emissions reduction pathway at a firm level which would approximate any nationally-
adopted emissions reduction pathway. In order to preserve the price signal to consumers, a tax 
might be imposed on locally-produced output which approximated the impact of the carbon tax 
on the firm. An alternative might be to compel expenditure on energy efficiency up to the level 
of the avoided tax revenue. 
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An obstacle to this kind of programme would be posed by the extent of emissions from energy-
intensive industrial activity, either directly or indirectly (through electricity), which could 
potentially comprise (depending on the threshold) up to 40 percent of national emissions. This 
suggests that a much more limited programme of rebates be considered, focusing on industries 
with specific vulnerabilities to international competition, or with historically unorthodox cost 
structures) for example synthetic fuels). 
4.3 Options investigated by Treasury 
National Treasury has considered the option of a carbon tax, in the form of a fuel input tax, as 
part of a broader consultation process on environmental fiscal reform. An initial discussion 
paper (Eunomia & UP 2004) and a discussion document were developed (National Treasury 
2003). Following workshops based on this information, an internal government policy paper 
was released for public comment in 2006 (National Treasury 2006).  
These initial documents suggested that the energy sector is likely to receive attention in future 
developments, particularly in relation to electricity generation and air pollution. An input tax on 
fossil fuels used for electricity generation may be considered, as might an electricity 
consumption tax. At least one observer suggests that such taxes would be likely to generate 
significant revenues, larger than the loss in sales revenue to Eskom (Winkler 2009). Net 
revenues could be used to compensate municipalities for their lost revenues under restructuring; 
to support transitions of affected sectors; or to promote specific projects with environmental 
benefits such as end-use energy-efficiency and renewable energy (see above, section 4.3).  
Of particular interest were ‘tax shifting’ programmes that use revenues from environmental 
taxes to offset taxes on labour (Winkler 2009). Taxes would have to be levied at the bulk level 
and explicitly exclude poor households (EDRC 2003; Nedergaard 2002). Such considerations 
also lead the discussion paper to favour a fuel input tax over another option initially investigated 
for the electricity sector, an electricity consumption tax (National Treasury 2006: Table 9). 
As noted in the Introductory Paper to this series (REF), the process has been more formalised 
following the Cabinet decision on LTMS (Van Schalkwyk 2008) and Minister Manuel’s 
announcement in his 2008 budget speech that ‘options that will now come under scrutiny for 
implementation include the use of emission charges and tradable permits, tax incentives for 
cleaner production technologies and reform of the existing vehicle taxes to encourage fuel 
efficiency’ (Manuel 2008). 
5. Conclusion  
A carbon tax should be considered among the range of instruments available to South African 
government, economy and society. It should be considered as part of a broader suite of options, 
including regulatory and economic instruments. Even in the latter category, this series of papers 
examines other options – cap-and-trade, trading of renewable energy or energy certificates. 
Indeed, an even broader range of incentives and taxes should be part of the discussion.  
A carbon tax was one of the most effective wedges or mitigation options analysed for the Long-
term mitigation scenarios. The LTMS strategic option ‘Using the market’ reduced emissions 
roughly as Required by Science, for several decades. The LTMS research indicated that the 
effectiveness increases, up to certain tax levels. South Africa might consider a tax starting 
around R100-200 / t CO2eq, escalating in future.  
An escalating CO2 would switch from coal to renewables and nuclear for electricity supply, and 
favour crude oil refineries over coal-to-liquids. Economic and industrial policy that redefines 
South Africa’s competitive advantage around climate-friendly technology and investments 
would be more resilient to a low-carbon future world.  
The efficiency with which a carbon tax achieves the goal of reducing GHG emissions depends 
on responsiveness and substitutability. Substitutability is key – the degree to which consumers 
The economic implications of a carbon tax  16 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE  The economics of climate change mitigation 
can switch to alternatives. Further work on the responsiveness of the South African economy 
and society to a carbon price signal is warranted.  
A price discovery and adjustment mechanism would be useful to adjust the tax to an optimal 
emissions pathway over time. We propose a mechanism that sets a band around the desired 
‘peak, plateau and decline’ trajectory, adjusting tax levels depending on reductions achieved – 
as measured ex post.  
Many further questions will need to be addressed, if a carbon tax is to be implemented as part of 
South Africa’s climate policy. Another critical set of questions not addressed in this paper 
regards the choice of economic instrument (broadly, tax or trading system or a hybrid), and its 
integration with other international instruments. 
Economic instruments may be highly efficient in allocating scarce resources. They do not 
however, tend to do well to address distributional concerns. Equity demands that poor 
households, in particular, be shielded from any burden, e.g. higher energy prices. Off-setting 
incentives, such as food subsidies or reduced VAT on basic goods, could be financed to achieve 
such a goal. Another option would be to finance energy efficiency and renewable energy in 
social housing. The principle would be to make the package a net benefit to the poor – and not 
to treat the tax as a revenue-raising instrument.  
Careful design of a carbon tax (or other economic instruments considered in this series) will be 
important to ensure that is effective in meeting its objective – reducing GHG emissions. With 
appropriate design, a carbon tax can be a powerful instrument of mitigation in South Africa, and 
at the same time contribute to socio-economic objectives.  
References  
ANC (African National Congress) 2007. Resolution on climate change: ANC 52nd National Conference, 
Polokwane, Limpopo. http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=ancdocs/history/jan8-08.html. 
Anderson, M S 2004. Vikings and virtues: a decade of CO2 taxation. Climate Policy 4 (1): 13–24. 
Anderson, M S 2008. Environmental and economic implications of taxing and trading carbon: Some 
European experiences. in J E Milne (Ed). The reality of carbon taxes in the 21st century. Vermont, 
Environmental Tax Policy Institute: 61-87. 
AsgiSA (Republic of South Africa) 2006. Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(AsgiSA) Pretoria. http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa/asgisa.htm, accessed December 2006. 
Bond, P 2000. Economic growth, ecological modernization or environmental justice? Conflicting 
discourses in South Africa today. Johannesburg, Municipal Services Project. 
CDC 2004. Investment opportunity. www.coega.co.za. 
Den Elzen, M, Höhne, N, Lucas, P L, Moltmann, S & Kuramochi, T 2007. The Triptych approach 
revisited: A staged sectoral approach for climate mitigation. MNP Report 500114008/2007. 
Bilthoven, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP). 
DME (Department of Minerals & Energy) 2008. National response to South Africa's electricity shortage. 
Pretoria. 
EDRC (Energy & Development Research Centre) 2003. Policies and measures for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency in South Africa. Prepared for the Sustainable Energy & Climate Change 
Partnership. Cape Town, EDRC, University of Cape Town. 
Eunomia & UP (Eunomia research & consulting and University of Pretoria) 2004. Development of a 
framework for market-based instruments to support environmental fiscal reform in South Africa. A 
draft final report for National Treasury of South Africa. Not for citation. Pretoria, Treasury. 
Fine, B & Rustomjee, Z 1996. The political economy of South Africa : from minerals-energy complex to 
industrialization. London, C. Hurst. 
Fisher, J & Grubb, M 1997. The use of economic models in climate change policy analysis. 5. Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. October 1997. 
The economic implications of a carbon tax  17 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE  The economics of climate change mitigation 
Hughes, A, Haw, M, Winkler, H, Marquard, A & Merven, B 2007. Energy emissions: A modelling input 
into the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios process. Prepared by the Energy Research Centre for 
Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria, October 2007. 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/LTMS/LTMS-intro.htm Accessed 30 October 2008. 
LCS (Low Carbon Society project) 2006. Developing visions for a Low-Carbon Society (LCS) through 
sustainable development. The first workshop of Japan-UK joint research project. Ibaraki, Japan, 
National Institute for Environmental Studies. 
Manuel, T 2008. Budget speech, 20 February. Cape Town, Parliament. 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2008/speech/speech.pdf Accessed 22 
February 2008. 
Manuel, T 2009. Budget speech, Minister of Finance. 11 February. Cape Town, Parliament. 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2009/speech/speech.pdf Accessed 11 
February 2009 
Michie, J & Padayachee, V 1998. Three years after Apartheid: Growth, employment and redistribution? 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 22: 623-635. 
National Treasury 2003. Market-based instruments to support environmental fiscal reform in South 
Africa: A discussion document. Pretoria, National Treasury. 
National Treasury 2006. A framework for considering market-based instruments to support 
environmental fiscal reform in South Africa. Draft policy paper. Pretoria, National Treasury Tax 
Policy Chief Directorate. http://www.treasury.gov.za/tax/default.htm. 
Nedergaard, M 2002. The application of economic instruments in energy and climate change policies. 
Sustainable Energy & Climate Change Partnership: A project of WWF Denmark and Earthlife Africa 
Johannesburg. http://www.earthlife.org.za/Files/Economic%20instruments%20-
%20M%20Nedergaard%202002.pdf Accessed on 15 May 2008. . 
NERSA (National Energy Regulator of South Africa) 2008. NIRP3 Stage 5: Risk & sensitivity analysis: 
Proposal for three diversified plans. 12 February  
Pacala, S & Socolow, R H 2004. Stabilization wedges: Solving the climate problem for the next 50 years 
with current technologies. Science 305 (13 August): 968-972. 
Pauw, K 2007. Economy-wide modeling: An input into the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios process, 
LTMS Input Report 4. Cape Town, Energy Research Centre. 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/LTMS/LTMS-intro.htm Accessed 30 October 2008. 
Pearce, D 1991. The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming. The Economic Journal 101: 
938-948. 
Raskin, P, Gallopin, G, Gutman, P, Hammond, A & Swart, R 1998. Bending the curve: Toward global 
sustainability. A report of the Global Scenario Group. Boston, Stockholm Environment Institute. 
SBT (Scenario Building Team) 2007. Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Strategic Options for South 
Africa. Pretoria Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism. 
http://www.environment.gov.za/HotIssues/2008/LTMS/A%20LTMS%20Scenarios%20for%20SA.pd
f Accessed 15 October 2008. 
Spalding-Fecher, R 2001. Energy and sustainability in South Africa: the 2001 Sustainable Energy Watch 
Report. Cape Town, Energy & Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Tyler, E, Dunn, Z, du Toit, M & Raubenheimer, S 2008. Carbon regulatory options in South Africa: A 
business briefing note. Prepared for the National Business Initiative. Version 1.2. Cape Town, Genesis 
Analytics. 
UK (United Kingdom) 2003. Our energy future - creating a low carbon economy. London, Department of 
Industry and Trade. www.dti.gov.uk/renewable/nffo.html. 
UNDP & GEF (United Nations Development Programme and Global Environmental Facility) 2002. 
Pioneering the low carbon future ... sustaining livelihoods: Experiences from GEF-UNDP projects in 
climate change and ozone depletion. New York. 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) 1997. Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bonn, UNFCCC Secretariat. 
Van Heerden, J, Gerlagh, R, Blignaut, J, Horridge, M, Hess, S, Mabugu, R & Mabugu, M 2006. 
Searching for triple dividends in South Africa: Fighting CO2 pollution and poverty while promoting 
growth. The Energy Journal 27 (2): 113-141. 
The economic implications of a carbon tax  18 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE  The economics of climate change mitigation 
Van Schalkwyk, M 2008. Government outlines vision, strategic direction and framework for climate 
policy. Statement by Marthinus van Schalkwyk, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 28 
July. Cape Town. www.environment.gov.za Accessed 29 July 2008. 
Visser, M, Spalding-Fecher, R & Leiman, A 1999. Manufacturing and economic growth. Paper No. 10: 
World Wildlife Fund Macroeconomic Reforms and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa 
Project. Cape Town, Energy & Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Winkler, H (Ed) 2007. Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Technical Report. Prepared by the Energy 
Research Centre for Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria, October 2007. 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/LTMS/LTMS-intro.htm Accessed 30 October 2008. 
Winkler, H 2009. Cleaner energy, cooler climate: Developing sustainable energy solutions for South 
Africa Cape Town, HSRC Press. 
Winkler, H & Marquard, A 2007. Energy development and climate change in South Africa: 
Decarbonising growth in South Africa. Occassional paper 2007/40, for UNDP's Human Development 
Report 2007/8: Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. New York, Human 
Development Report Office. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-
2008/papers/winkler_harald%20and%20marquard_andrew.pdf accessed 29 January 2008. 
Zipplies, R (Ed) 2009. Bending the curve: Your guide to tackling climate change in South Africa. 
Contributors: R Zipplies. Cape Town, Africa Geographic  
 
 
 
